We propose to study electricity capacity remuneration mechanism design through a principal–agent approach. The principal represents the aggregation of electricity consumers (or a representative entity), subject to the physical risk of shortage, and the agent represents the electricity capacity owners, who invest in capacity and produce electricity to satisfy the demand of consumers, and are subject to financial risks. Following the methodology of Cvitanic & al (2018), we propose an optimal contract, from the perspective of consumers, which complements the revenue capacity owners achieved from the spot energy market, and incentivizes both parties to perform an optimal level of investment while sharing the physical and financial risks. Numerical results provide insights on the necessity of a capacity remuneration mechanism and also show how this is especially true when the level of uncertainties on demand or production side increases.
Joint work with Marcelo Saguan
- The seminar is supported by the Labex (Laboratory of excellence) of Institut Louis Bachelier -